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terpretation of "mutual economic benefit." A boy was in a roundhouse
for the purpose of soliciting advertisements for a local paper from the
superintendent (who had no authority to order such ads). His presence
was not requested, there was no history of past dealings, and he was injured before accomplishing his purpose. The court held that he was an
invitee saying, "[He] was engaged upon the course of a legitimate business venture which unquestionably promised benefit to himself and which
held out at least potential benefit to defendant company."-"
One of the underlying reasons for the apparent extension of liability in
"invitee cases" well may be that the storekeeper actually did or did not do
something which caused the damage and that it is only a matter of chance
that the one injured (who was rightfully upon the premises) happened
to be a non-customer. The storekeeper also seems to be in a better position
to protect himself against the disastrous results of such injuries.
Although in close cases the courts talk about economic benefit and business dealings, the recent decisions would seem to be more properly based
on what is often given as a secondary basis for liability; that is, an implied
public invitation to enter for certain purposes, not necessarily tied up directly with profit to the storekeeper.3 2 This is the theory advocated by
Professor Prosser,33 which we have seen used as a supplementary basis for
liability in the Renfro case 3 4 and used by an increasing number of courts
in the same way.3 5 Although the practical results in terms of liability are
usually the same under either theory it would seem that the theory of implied invitation is a more realistic approach to the problem.

CREATION AND EXISTENCE OF JOINT TENANCIES IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY-A STUDY OF
FORMALITIES AND INTENT
The creation of joint interests in personal property has become a needlessly complicated procedure. Although the intention of the parties may
clearly be to create joint interests with the right of survivorship, too frequently the desired result is not attained because of an unwitting failure
to comply with historical legal formalities. It is further complicated by the
tendency of the courts to apply real property principles rather automatically to personal property problems.
Originally the courts favored the centralization of titles and encouraged
31 Ibid., at 276.

82 Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 235 S.W. zd 6o9, 617 (Tex., 1950); Campbell v.
,
Weathers, 153 Kan. 316, i1 P. 2d 72 76 (1941).
33 Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 6oz (1942).
84
Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 235 S.W. 2d 6o9, 617 (Tex., 1950).
35 Cases cited note 32, supra.
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joint tcnancies. but later this type of interest fell from favor.' These relationships were possible only if the strict requirements of the four unitiestime, title, interest and possession-were met.2 Similarly, although a joint
tenancy in personalty was recognized at common law in Illinois, 3 the creation of one by the deposit of an individual's own funds was impossible
because of a lack of the unities. 4 It has been said that a joint tenancy must
be created by the explicit term "as joint tenants and not as tenants in common," 5 but there is a question as to whether the right of survivorship must
be so expressed or if words of similar import are sufficient.6 Whatever view
is accepted, it is clear that joint tenancies are frowned upon by the courts
7
which seem desirous of protecting heirship rights.
8
In Illinois, the Joint Rights and Obligations Act was an attempt to clarify the status of joint tenancies but did little to eliminate the confusion.
Judicial interpretation established that the act was applicable to personal
property" and that it was not a remedial statute, i.e., it did not provide a
simplified method for creating joint tenancies, but it simply confirmed the
rigid common law requirements.10
The joint tenancy being considered an unusual type of property interest,
it has been held in Illinois that a person claiming title as a surviving joint
tenant has the burden of proving that he is within the exceptions established
by the act." Some states hold, especially in bank deposit and deposit box
cases, that if the instrument creating the relationship uses the customary
language of joint tenancy there is a presumption that such an interest was
created.12 This presumption is conclusive in the absence of fraud" or cir1 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 421 ( 3d ed.,
2
3

1939).

Ibid., at 5 418.
In re Estate of Halaska, 307 Ill.
App. 183, 30 N.E. 2d 117 (1940).

4 ZTiffany, Real Property .418 (3d ed., 1939).
Wilson v. Wilson, 404 Ill. 207, 88 N.E. _d 66z (1949); See Wallace v. Riley,
23 Cal. App. 2d 669, 74 P. 2d Soo ('937).
6
Lindner & Boyden Bank v. Wardop, 291 111.
App. 454, ioN.E. zd I44 (937);
In re Estate of Jirovec, 285 II1.App. 499, 2 N.E. 2d 354 (1936).
7 Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Wonnell, 61 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. N.Y., 1945).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 76, §2. "Except as to executors and trustees, and except
also whereby will or other instrument in writing expressing an intention to create
a joint tenancy in personal property with right of survivorship, the right or incident
of survivorship as bctween joint tenants or owners of personal property is hereby
abolished and all such joint tenancies or ownerships shall, to all intents and purposes,
be deemed tenancies in common; provided, that when a deposit in any bank or trust

company ... has been made or shall hereafter be made in the names of two or more
persons payable to them . . . such deposit .. .paid to any one of said persons ...
shall be valid and sufficient discharge from all parties to the bank for payments so made."
i)David v. Ridgely-Farmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 I11.
App. 96, 95 N.E. 2d 725 (1950).
10\Vilson v. Wilson, 404 IN. 207, 88 N.E.

2d

662 (1949).

' Case cited note 9 supra.
In re Juedel's Will, 28o N.Y. 37, 19 N.E. 2d 671 (1939)
11 In re Conover's Estate, 163 N.Y. Misc. 699, 297 N.Y. Supp. 577 (Surr. Ct., 1937).
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cumstances tending to vitiate the survivor's claim. In other states, statutes
favor or presume the creation of a tenancy in common, 15 but these are mere
rules of construction and do not abolish joint tenancies 16 or the possibility
of providing survivorship rights. 17 They merely necessitate their creation
by explicit terms. The statutes normally are applied to both personalty and
realty' s but in at least one jurisdiction such a statute has been held applicable only to realty. 19 It has also been held that survivorship rights are not
20
contrary to public policy.
Some courts, while denying the presumption of joint tenancies, have
upheld rights of survivorship when such rights are based on a valid contract. 21 It seems the courts consider a contract involving personalty with
rights incidentally similar to real property joint tenancy as technically
different from an express joint tenancy relation, favoring form rather than
substance.
Where the right of joint tenancy in personal property is recognized by
common law or by statute, such relationship can be created in both corporeal2 2 and incorporeal 23 interests. Joint tenancies can exist in any per24
sonal property which can be subjected to individual dominion.
Even though the validity of joint interests in personalty is recognized,
the problem of how and in what circumstances they are created remains.
Although the courts recognize the peculiarities of joint tenancies in bank
accounts and safety deposit boxes, and treat these somewhat differently
than joint tenancies in ordinary chattels and other choses in action, there
are general principles applicable irrespective of the subject matter. The
bank cases, as might be expected, comprise the bulk of litigation on these
problems.
Joint tenancies can be created by contract, transfer, conveyance, or other
similar means; 25 they can never be created by laws of descent or operation
14 Long v. Dempsey, 5z N.Y.S. zd 93 (S. Ct., Monroe County, Dec. 28, 1944).
15 For these jurisdictions, see 48 C.J.S. Co-Tenancy § (1939).
16 Greenwood v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 134 F. 2d 915 (C.A. 9 th, 1943).
17 Edwards v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 102 F. 2d 757 (C.A. ioth, 1939).
18 Case cited note 16 supra.
19 Gallagher v. R.I. Hospital Trust Co., 2z R.I. 141, 46 Ad. 451 (19oo).
20 Manning v. U.S. Nat. Bank of Portland, 174 Ore. i18, 148 P. zd 255 (1944).
21 Beach v. Holland, 172 Ore. 396, T4 P. 2d 990 (1943).
22

Johnston v. Johnston, 173 Mo. 91, 73 S.V. 202 (19o3).
23 Insurance policies, ibid.; building and loan deposits, Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio
St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935); corporate securities, In re McKelway's Estate, 221 N.Y.
15, 116 N.E. 348 (1917).
24 Lindner & Boyden Bank v. Wardop, 291 Ill.
App. 454, 1o N.E. 2d 144 (1937);
Att'y Gen. ex rel. Treasurer and Receiver General v. Clark, 222 Mass. 291, 11o N.E.299
(1915)5; In re McKelway's Estate, 2ii
N.Y. iS,16 N.E.348 (1917).
25 See David v. Ridgely-Farmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 III. App. 96, 95 N.E. zd 725
(1950).
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27
of law. Some jurisdictions permit the relationship by oral contract.
A controversial point, at least in Illinois, is whether the technical unities
of time, title, interest, and possession are required in the formation of a
joint tenancy in personalty. Wilson v. Wilson28 implies by dicta that the
unities are necessary, but prior decisions have impliedly sanctioned their
absence by upholding survivorship rights in spite of the obvious absence
of the unities.2 9 There is no Illinois ruling directly on the question but recent dicta
indicates that the common law requisites are still in favor in
o
26

Illinois.3

By analogy to real property law this would seem to require a sole owner,
desiring to effect a transfer into joint tenancy with himself and another, to
transfer title to a third party who in turn would make a reconvevance to
the proposed joint tenants. " '
The sufficiency of the description of the property raises another problem.
The Wilson case, involving a safety deposit box, stated that the contents
must be described in an unambiguous document which conveys a present
interest. If currency be the subject matter, the exact amount must be specified in the instrument of conveyance, and even a contract purporting to
32
convey "any and all" contents of a safety deposit box seems insufficient.
The accuracy of descripton required for the creation of a joint tenancy
thus is greater than that required to pass property by will.
Another cause of uncertainty in the creation of joint tenancies is the
question as to the necessity of an express statement that the parties are to
enjoy the "right of survivorship" in haec verba. Are words of similar import
sufficient or is that magic expression necessary to effectuate the parties

intent? In David v. Ridgely-Farmer's Safe Deposit Co., 33 the court indicated in its discussion of the Wilson decision that the right of survivorship
must be spelled out expressly. This seems rather incongruous inasmuch as
the courts are willing to ascertain and follow the intention of the parties,
84
however expressed, in the real property cases.
N.E. 2d 662 (949).
Peterson v. Lake City Bank & Trust Co., 181 Minn. 128, 23t N.W. 794 (1930).
28404 Ill. 207, 88 N.E. 2d 66z (949).
26Wilson v. Wilson, 404 III. 207, 88
27

29

In re Koester's Estate, z86 Ill. App. 113, 3 N.E. 2d io2 (1936).

See David v. Ridgely-Farmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 I11.App. 96, 95 N.E. zd 725
But for dicta to contrary see Strout v. Gurgess, 69 A. 2d 241, (Me. 1949) in
which a certificate of stock rc-issued in the name of the owner and another was held
30

(1950).

a tenancy in common.
S1 Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 I11. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (928).
& Say. Bank, 376 Il- 413., 34 N.E. 2d 414 (194).

See Hood v. Comm. Trust

82 See David v. Ridgelv-Farmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 Il. App. 96, 95 N.E. 2d 725
(195o), in which it was said that the Koester case was overruled by implication since

the latter case did not meet the requisites of the description as espoused in the Wilson
decision.
33 342 Ill. App. 96, 95 N.E. zd 725 (1950).
34 Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (9z8).
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This inconsistency disappears if a distinction is made between joint
tenancies in personal property and real property, as one Illinois case did,
saying, "... the only common element is survivorship. ' ' 3
The litigation over joint tenancies involving banks is abundant. These
cases involve: (a) deposit accounts; (b) safety deposit boxes. The basic
fact situation terminating in litigation occurs when A and B execute what
is intended to be a joint tenancy instrument, in conjunction with a deposit
in an account or a safety deposit box agreement. On the death of A, a dispute arises between the alleged joint tenant and the executor or administrator of the deceased to determine the status of each.
Bank accounts are held in joint jenancy according to intent,3 6 and the
same applies to safety deposit boxes, 37 but in view of the Wilson and David
decisions, the Illinois courts seem oblivious to intention and rely on presumptions, almost conclusive, against joint tenancies.
Lack of knowledge of one party to a joint deposit will not defeat his
rights as a survivor in either a bank deposit s or a safety deposit box. 3 9
Generally speaking, the courts allow recovery on one of three theories:
(a) gift, (b) contract, (c) trust. 40 It may be assumed that recovery by the
survivor anywhere can be had on any theory if the circumstances clearly
substantiate it. The problem arises in the absence of any clear factual situation. At times, recovery is allowed without indication of the theoretical
41
basis.
Under the gift theory, a donoy-decedent makes a deposit in his name and
the name of a donee-survivor. The general rule is that if the elements of a
personal property gift are present, i.e., intention, delivery, and acceptance,
the donee-survivor takes an interest, 42 but a mere deposit by A in the name
of A and B, even if receipts are payable to either is not in itself a gift.43
The problem in the gift theory is to show delivery to the donee and
relinquishment of control by the donor. There must be either a cessation of
dominion over the money 4 or the intent to give, even if the donor kept
See dissent in Ill. Trust &Sav. Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 Ill. 185, 141 N.E. 546 (1923).
WVilliarn v. Tuch, 313 111.App. 230, 39 N.E. zd 695 (1942); In re Estate of
Halaska, 307 Ill. App. 183, 30 N.E. zd 117 (1940).
37Lindsay v. Dean, 68 Cal. App. 2d 86, 155 P. 2d 9o (1945).
38
Cuilini v. Northern Trust Co., 335 111.App. 86, So N.E. 2d 275 (1948)39 David v. Ridgelv-Farmcrs Safe Deposit Co., 342 I11.
App. 96, 95 N.E. 2d 725 (1950)
3

36

(semble).
40
Lindner &Boyden Bank v. XVardrop,
41 See Quigley v. Quigley, 85 F. ,d 300

zd 909 (App. D.C.,
42

291

I11.App. 454, io N.E. 2d 144 ('937).

(App. D.C., 1936); Garrett v. Keister, 56 F.

1932).

Reder v. Reder, 312 I11. 209, 14"3 N.E. 418 (1924); Millard v. Millard, 22z1
111.
86.
77 NE. 595 (19o6).
4 Engelbrecht v. Engelbrecht, 323 I1. 208, 153 N.E. 827 (1926); but see Pendley v.
Pendley, x63 N.Y. Misc., 571, 298 N.Y. Supp. 31£ (S. Ct., Duchess County, 1937).
44McDermott v. Bennett, 279 N.Y. 579, 17 N.E. 2d 448 (1938); Hurley v. Malloy,
ziN.Y.S. zd 974 (S. Cr., N.Y. County, 1940).
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control of the income4 The courts are divided as to the time title is to pass;
some saying it must pass at deposit,46 while others say it can pass at the
47

death of the donor.
Jurisdictions differ as to whether joint tenancy by gift is in fact a testas
mentary disposition without compliance with the statute of wills.4

The leading case of Matthew v. Moncrief,49 dealing with the existence
of a contract and its relation to the gift theory, stated that circumstances of
the particular case should control, while other cases take the position that
the contract is prima facie evidence of a gift.50
It can be generally stated that Illinois rejects recovery on a gift theory in
favor of the contract concept, when the latter can be applied reasonably. 1
The contract theory is applied by the courts in one of two ways. The
first operates as a "gift of an interest therein created by contract. ' 52 The
second is somewhat more in accord with true contract principles and may
be referred to as the Illinois rule, for this jurisdiction relies conspicuously
on the agreement of the depositor in determining the rights of the parties.53
As will be seen, the courts no longer concern themselves with the existence
of unities. Exemplifying this is the case of Cuilini v. Northern Trust
Company.5 4 In that case, A was aged and unable to carry on regular banking practices. For convenience of withdrawal, A, and B, a nephew, signed
a Joint tenancy agreement with the bank. B admitted he was to act as agent
and never considered himself to have any interest in the funds. Yet, upon
litigation, a judgment was entered for B, as survivor, as against the heirs of
A. The courts said that the contract was clear, and in the absence of fraud,
parol evidence was inadmissible to determine ownership. The Illinois court
has also said it is not necessary for both parties to sign the agreement,55
45 Goldston v. Randolph, 293 Mass. 253, i99 N.E. 896 (1936).

McDermott v. Bennett, 279 N.Y. 579, 17 N.E. 2d 448 (1938).
v.Buss, 293 Mass. 329, ig9 N.E. 750 (1936).
Held such is testamentary disposition. Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. King,58 Ariz.
477, 121 P. 2d 429 (1942); Taylor v.Grimes, 223 Iowa 821, 273 N.W.898 (1937). But
see Erwin v.Felter, 283 Ill.
36, ii9 N.E.926 0918); Reder v.Reder, 312 Ill.209, 143
46

47 Batal
48

N.E.48 (1924).
40 135 F. 2d 645 (C.A.D.C., 1943).

50 Holbrook v.Hendrick's Estate, 175 Ore. 159, 152 P.2d 573 (1944). But see Massachusetts which states that the contract controls the relationship but its efficacy rests
on the intention to make a gift, Goldston v.Randolph,293 Mass. 253, 199 N.E.896 (1936),

or the contract dispenses with the formal requisites of a gift, Sullivan v. Hudgins,
303 Mass. 442, 22 N.E. ad 43 (1939).
51 Landretto v.First Trust & Say. Bank of Chicago, 333 Ill. 442, 164 N.E. 836 (1928).
52 Goldston v. Randolph, 293 Mass. 253, 199 N.E. 896 (1936).
53 Landretto v.First Trust & Sav. Bank of Chicago, 333 Ill.
442, 164 N.E. 836
0928); Hood v.Commonwealth Trust & Say. Bank, 376 111.413, 34 N.E. Id414 ('941).
54 335 Ill.
App.86, 8o N.E. 2d 275 (1948).
55 Vaughan v. Millikan Nat. Bank, 263 Ill.
App. 301 (1931).
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and that the contract may be with the bank or between the parties.
As in any other contract, one creating a joint tenancy must be based on
a consideration. 57 Illinois relies on the fact that consideration between the
bank and the depositor establishes the co-depositor as a third party doneebeneficiary.58
The result as to the survivorship in safety deposit box cases based on a
contract is altogether different. Here again the courts overlook any agreement the parties made in favor of the stringent requirements of common
law joint tenancies. This is best illustrated by the Wilson case. In that case,
a husband and wife rented two safety deposit boxes and signed a printed
card stating, "as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants
in common." Placed in the box, along with currency and bonds accumulated by the husband, was a memorandum signed by him, stating, "there is
$37,ooo in this box and it is a joint tenancy between my wife and myself."
The court held that a joint tenancy in the contents of the box was established by neither the lease agreement nor the memorandum, because the
former did not purport to convey anything and left the subject matter to
conjecture, while the latter neither expressly provided for survivorship
nor purported to be a transfer of any interest.
One may wonder at this paradox between the desire to protect the survivor in bank accounts on one hand, and the contrary desire to defeat such
rights in safety deposit boxes on the other. Can these attitudes in any way
be reconciled?
In a bank deposit, the title to the money is in the bank, and the depositor
is merely a creditor. ' 9 Consequently, an agreement with the bank to deliver
the money to the survivor is binding upon the bank, who, as owner, can
transfer the funds on deposit.
In a safety deposit box agreement, the bank is either a bailee or a lessor
depending on the jurisdiction. In either case, no title to the contents passes
to the bank; consequently, the contract to deliver to the survivor is merely
to discharge the bank from liability and cannot operate as a transfer of the
property because the bank was never owner.60
The courts sometimes apply the constructive trust theory in one of two
ways, to both bank deposits and safety deposit cases. The first situation
56 Ibid.

r. Hamilton v. ist State Bank of Willow Hill, 254 Ill. App. 55 (929). Some courts
say the deposit is evidence of services tendered for the survivor, Armstrong v. Morris
Plan Industrial Bank, 282 Ky. 192, 138 S.W. 2d 359 (194o). Others say the act of depositing is an execution of the contract and consideration is dispensed with, Sage v.
Flueck, 132 Ohio St. 377, 7 N.E. zd 8o2 (1937).
58 McIlrath v. McIlrath, 276 111.App. 4o8 (1934); Castle v. Wightman, 303 Mass. 74
zo N.E.

2d

436 (1939).

59 Mutual Accident Ass'n of the Northwest v. Jacobs, 141 UI.
60 Case cited note 9 supra.

261 (1892).
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exists when the joint tenant is allowed to take as survivor but is compelled
to hold the deposit in trust for the contributor's heirs.61 In the case cited,
an aged invalid signed a joint tenancy agreement with a nephew to facilitate payment of medical expenses. The court said that, as far as the bank
was concerned, the joint tenancy was valid but that any title in the nephew
was held in trust for the decedent's heirs.
The other application of the trust theory exists when the joint tenancy
fails as such; nevertheless, since the intent was to have an interest pass, the
courts, as in Strout v. Burgess,6 2° make the survivor a tenant in common,
with the interest of the decedent held in trust for such survivor.
There must be some evidence of an intent to create a trust; 3 a mere4
provision for payment to either party of a joint deposit is not sufficient.
There are several other collateral circumstances which may affect the
ownership claim of an alleged joint tenancy relationship in banks. 5
The sufficiency of the written instrument creating the alleged joint
tenancy is an important problem in Illinois. It has been held that in a rental
of a safety deposit box, a card stamped "... either or survivor" could take
the contents was not an instrument creating a joint tenancy. 0 Again, a letter written by the lessee of a safety deposit box saying, "I want you to have
what's in there, if I don't get back," was not an instrument in writing as
required by the statute. 67 Nor was a rental agreement stating the contents
were to be in joint tenancy with survivorship sufficient.08 By contrast, in
bank accounts no written instrument is needed, 9 although opening an
draw, did not
account in the name of "Mr. and Mrs. A," even if both could
70
establish the right of survivorship under joint tenancy.
In addition, there is no joint tenancy with survivorship created by issu61 Williams v. Tuch, 313 Ill. App. 230, 39 N.E. zd 695 (1942).
A. zd 241 (Mc., 1949). But see Kane v. Johnson, 397 Ill. i12, 73 N.E. 2d 321
(1947).
(3 Sturgis v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Pokamoke City, 15z Md. 654, 137 Atl. 378 (1927);
Greeley v. O'Connor, 294 Mass. 527, 2 N.E. 2d 471 (1936).
473, 138 N.E. 158 (1923).
64 Bolton v. Bolton, 306 111.
65 Possession of passbook immaterial, Kroening v. Kroening, 330 I11.App. 7, 69 N.E.
,d 696 (1946); Cuilini v. Northern Trust Co., 335 III. App. 86, 8o N.E. 2d 275 (1948).
But see McDermott v. Bennett, 279 N.Y. 579, 17 N.E. zd 448 (1938). Ownership of
funds immaterial, Cuilini v. Northern Trust Co., 335 111.App. 86, 8o N.E. ad 275
(1948). Ignorance of deposit immaterial, Vaughan v. Millikan Nat. Bank, 263 I1. App.
301 (193).
App. 499, z N.E. zd 354 (1936).
646In re Estate of Jirovec, z85 I11.
339
I1.
App. 353, 90 N.E. zd 300 (1950).
of
Brokow,
67 In re Estate
6
,XVilson v. Wilson, 404 11. 207, 88 N.E. zd 66z ('949). But see In re Koester's
Estate, 286 Ill. App. i13, 3 N.E. zd ,oz (1936).
App. 301 (1931).
69 Vaughan v. Millikin Nat. Bank, z63 I11.
0
227
(1924).
245
111.
App.
Crawford,
v.
- Crawford
(268
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ance of certificates of deposit, payable to "A, or B, or survivor" if the
71
amount was from A's account and without consideration.
Although the Joint Rights and Obligations Act in Illinois does not require
a tenancy in common to exist if the joint tenancy has failed, 72 there are
cases where a tenancy in common was upheld upon the failure of the joint
tenancy to be perfected, 73 on the ground of an implied gift of one-half undivided interest.7 4 This is not merely the interpretation that the court gives
to the decedent's intent but is the interest passed when an admitted joint
75
tenancy fails for some reason.
The problems involved in the creation and existence of joint tenancies
are numerous; worse than this they are unnecessary. The obvious defeat of
the decedent's intent is an unfortunate aspect of the law. The formalities
are disturbing not only to the layman, but to the banker and attorney as
well. The frequency of litigation is also a discouraging feature in joint
tenancies in personalty.
It seems advisable in light of the situation to clarify the status of joint
tenancy relationships. The statute in Illinois today is obviously inadequate
because it merely recognizes that joint tenancies can be created but furnishes no simple procedure for creating such an interest.
The conclusion is obvious: Unless the statute is revised or amended the
stringent common law formalities will remain supreme over the intention
of the parties.
71 Hamilton v. ist State Bank of Willow Hill, 254 Ill. App. 55 (1929); Engelbrecht v.
Engelbrecht, 323 111. zo8, 153 N.E. 827 (1926).
72
Harrington v. Emmerman, 186 F. zd 757 (App. D.C., 195o); David v. RidgelyFarmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 Ill. App. 96, 95 N.E. 2d 725 (1950); In re Estate of
Grote, 203 Ill. App. 50 (916).
73 Crawford v. Crawford, 245 Il. App. 2z7 (1924).
74 Ibid.
75 Harrington v. Emmerman, 186 F. 2d 757 (App. D.C., 1950).

